Pension reform, savings behavior and capital market performance by Börsch-Supan, Axel et al.
 mea – M
annheim
er Forschungsinstitut Ö
konom
ie und D
em
ographischer W
andel
G
ebäude L 13, 17_D
-68131 M
annheim
_Sekretariat +49 621 181-2773/1862_Telefax  +49 621 181-1863_w
w
w
.m
ea.uni-m
annheim
.de 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pension reform, savings behavior and  
capital market performance 
 
 
Axel H. Börsch-Supan, F. Jens Köke and Joachim K. Winter  
 
 
53-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
June 2004 
This version: 30. June 2004 
 
 
Pension reform, savings behavior 
and capital market performance 
 
 
Axel H. Börsch-Supan*#, F. Jens Köke*, and Joachim K. Winter* 
* Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Aging (MEA), Department of Economics, 
University of Mannheim, Germany 
# National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), Cambridge, Massachusetts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper shows that the capital market effects of population aging and pension reform are particularly 
strong in continental European economies such as France, Germany, and Italy. Reasons are threefold: 
these countries have large and ailing pay-as-you-go public pension systems, relatively thin capital markets 
and less than benchmark capital performance. The aging process will force the younger generations in 
these countries to provide more retirement income through own private saving. Capital markets will there-
fore grow in size and active institutional investors will become more important as intermediaries. Aim of 
this paper is to show that these changes are likely to generate beneficial side effects in terms of improved 
productivity and aggregate growth. 
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1. Introduction 
Population aging is precipitating pension reform and with it the nature of capital markets 
in continental Europe. It is forcing the younger generation to provide more retirement income 
through own private saving. The markets for retirement savings are therefore growing in size, 
and active institutional investors are becoming more important as intermediaries. Aim of this 
paper is to show that these changes are likely to generate beneficial side effects in terms of im-
proved productivity and aggregate growth. 
We start with three observations. First, France, Germany, and Italy, to take the three larg-
est economies in continental Europe, have large pay-as-you-go (PAYG) public pension systems 
which face severe problems due to population aging.1  The size of the public pension systems as 
a percentage of GDP will increase by between 50 and 100 percent from 1995 to 2030 in France, 
Germany and Italy, if benefits were to remain constant in real terms (see table 1). If these addi-
tional expenditures were financed solely by contributions, the equilibrium contribution rates as a 
percentage of the wage bill will rise to 38 percent in France, 41 percent in Germany, and 62 per-
cent in Italy.2  If the additional burden was financed solely by debt, it would exceed 100 percent 
of GDP in France, 115 percent in Germany, and as much as 180 percent in Italy by the year 2035. 
Our second observation is that France, Germany, and Italy have thin capital markets. 
They are thin in the sense that only few households own and control productive capital (either 
directly or via investment and pension funds). French, German, and Italian savers hold a consid-
erable smaller share of stocks than households in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. As a result, stock market capitalization is low in these three countries, and institu-
tional investors such as pension funds play only a minor role in household saving, see table 2. 
Third and finally, we observe that France, Germany, and Italy have, in comparison to the 
United States, poor capital performance as measured by aggregate capital productivity and vari-
ous aggregate rates of return. While international comparisons of these statistics are not straight-
forward, the existing evidence summarized in table 3 yields a clear picture backed up by micro-
economic evidence. Firms in France, Germany, and Italy have substantially lower capital produc-
                                                 
1 OECD, 1988; World Bank, 1994; Economic Policy Committee, 2000. 
2 The following projections have been computed by the International Monetary Fund (Chand and Jaeger, 1996). Similar numbers 
have been published by the OECD (Rosevaere, Leibfritz, Fore, and Wurzel, 1996). 
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tivity and return on investment than U.S. companies achieve. Relative to the United States, finan-
cial underperformance is also correlated with lower levels of total factor productivity. Many au-
thors claim that an important cause for this underperformance is weak corporate governance (see, 
e.g., Wenger and Kaserer, 1998; Börsch-Supan, 1998; Mueller and Yurtoglu, 2000). 
The relations between these three observations are the topic of this paper. We argue that 
population aging and pension reform, via a change in the savings behavior and portfolio compo-
sition of households, and via strengthening capital allocation and corporate governance through 
active institutional investors, are likely to have important and beneficial side effects on produc-
tivity and growth that offset some of the negative macroeconomic implications of aging. 
Our line of argument proceeds in two steps. First, population aging will change house-
holds’ saving behavior because the internal rate of return generated by the pay-as-you-go pension 
systems will decrease, making own savings as a vehicle for retirement income both more neces-
sary and attractive. In many countries, such as France, Italy, and Germany, population aging 
makes fundamental reform of public pension systems a top priority, strengthening own savings 
for retirement. Even if no additional savings were created in the aggregate, a larger share of sav-
ings will be devoted to retirement and flow through traded shares and bonds, intermediated by 
institutional investors. Second, the resulting larger share of intermediated capital will create 
thick-market externalities and has the potential to improve corporate governance. Both effects 
tend to increase productivity and growth. We produce microeconomic evidence based on newly 
assembled firm data in Germany and Great Britain which shows that actively managed invest-
ment by institutional investors enhances corporate governance and through this channel increases 
productivity and growth. 
Research on these complex issues has not yet come far and enthusiasm for capital market 
related research has declined. The stock market crisis after the bubble burst and the ENRON 
scandal have cast grave doubts on capital market performance everywhere, including the United 
States. Moreover, evidence on firm performance in fundamentally different institutional settings 
is scarce, and establishing causality to explain observed differences is difficult. Nonetheless, 
capital markets will become ever more important as our populations age since capital has to sub-
stitute for increasingly scarce labor. This paper wants to pay tribute to this role. Its aim is to pro-
vide a coherent framework to study how population aging and pension reform might change capi-
tal markets, and through the capital markets growth and productivity. In order to do so, we gather 
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the empirical evidence that is already available, use a macroeconomic simulation model to quan-
tify potential effects, add new evidence on the impact of institutional investors on productivity, 
and highlight potential implications for public policy. 
The remainder of the paper is structured accordingly. Section 2 reviews the literature. It 
presents various theoretical channels linking capital market features with economic performance 
and collects the existing evidence. Section 3 makes the first step in our argument. From a macro-
economic perspective, we compute the size of the capital stock generated by households’ optimal 
response to population aging and under a realistic transition to a partially funded system. The 
potential magnitude of capital stock changes is important because it provides the leverage for 
changes in capital market structure and its effects on productivity and economic growth. Section 
4 presents microeconometric evidence on these effects using a newly assembled panel data set of 
German and UK companies. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
2. Channels through which capital markets affect productivity and growth 
We are not the first to argue that the development of financial markets is an important fac-
tor in explaining the sources of productivity and economic growth.3 In this section, we summa-
rize what we know about how capital markets which are thicker and funnel more funds through 
institutional investors affect productivity and economic growth. 
Among the many theoretical models that analyze the role of financial markets for resource 
allocation and corporate governance, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Holmstrom and Tirole 
(1993) show that as markets become larger and more liquid, market participants have more in-
centives to acquire information about firms. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) show that linking manager compensation to stock performance helps to align the interests 
of managers with those of owners, and that takeovers are easier in well-developed stock markets, 
thus improving corporate governance.  
The empirical literature that explores these mechanisms has grown dramatically over the 
last few years. Levine (1997) and Rajan and Zingales (2001) provide comprehensive surveys; 
Beck and Levine (2001) review the more recent literature. In the following, we mention only a 
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few results that are of particular relevance to our argument. In a careful time-series study with 
aggregate data, Neusser and Kugler (1998) demonstrate that financial sector development pre-
dicts GDP growth and, in particular, total factor productivity. Levine and Zervos (1998) report 
that stock market liquidity is positively and robustly correlated with contemporaneous and future 
rates of economic growth, consistent with the view that a greater ability to trade ownership of an 
economy’s productive technologies facilitates efficient resource allocation, physical capital for-
mation, and faster economic growth. Levine and Zervos also find no negative impact of stock 
market liquidity, international capital market integration, or stock return volatility on private sav-
ings.  Similar findings have been obtained by Rajan and Zingales (1998) who compare industrial 
sectors across countries, arguing that financial development reduces the costs of external finance 
to firms. Wurgler (2000) confirms that financial markets play an important role in the capital al-
location process. He reports that the efficiency of capital allocation is positively correlated with 
the degree of legal protection of investors (i.e., in Anglo-American, market-based financial sys-
tems). In particular, Wurgler argues that market-based systems are more successful in limiting 
overinvestment in declining industries. Using cross-country panel data, Beck, Levine, and 
Loayza (2000) and Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) show that financial intermediaries exert a 
large, positive impact on total factor productivity and GDP growth. Finally, Beck and Levine 
(2002) argue that while legal system efficiency and overall financial development boost eco-
nomic growth, there appears to be no significant difference between market or bank-based finan-
cial systems. 
One frequently made objection against a causal interpretation of the relation between fi-
nancial markets development and economic growth is that financial development is only a lead-
ing indicator of growth, i.e., that expected of economic growth causes improvements in the finan-
cial sector. It is our reading of the literature that the well-documented positive effect of financial 
market development on economic growth is not due to reversed causality. The study by Beck and 
Levine (2001) confirms this view. They use sophisticated econometric panel methods with data 
from 40 countries and the 1976-1998 period. With these more robust econometric techniques, 
they maintain the result that both stock markets and banks have a positive effect on economic 
                                                                                                                                                              
3 See Levine (1997) for an extensive review of this literature and Carlin and Mayer (2003) for a more recent contribution. 
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growth and that this result is not due to simultaneity, reverse causality, or unobserved country-
specific effects. 
In order to break the potential simultaneity, some recent studies employ data at a more 
disaggregate level than the macroeconomic analyses mentioned above. There are two avenues. 
First, there is a large number of case studies which investigate the effect of active pension funds 
in those countries where they exist. We will summarize them in the sequel of this section. The 
second avenue employs industry- and company level data that provide direct evidence on the 
existence of a causal channel from financial market development, and in particular corporate 
governance, to productivity growth. Such data is scarce. McKinsey (1996) and Börsch-Supan 
(1998) use proprietary company data. Köke and Renneboog (2002) is another example of a mi-
croeconometric study that links corporate governance and productivity using a generally accessi-
ble firm panel. In section 4 of this paper, we follow their approach. 
An important way for pension fund managers to improve the performance of their funds is 
to take an active role in improving corporate governance. The role of large shareholders in disci-
plining management and the effectiveness of shareholder activism are central to understanding 
the macroeconomic consequences of an increase in pre-funded pensions.4 The basic theoretical 
argument has been made, for example, by Pound (1988): Institutional investors such as pension 
funds that have no business relations with a firm can do a better job in disciplining management. 
To further our main argument, it would be most helpful to substantiate Pound’s (1988) theoretical 
analysis with data on French, German, and Italian pension funds. Pension funds, however, and 
mutual funds more generally, play almost no role in corporate governance in most continental 
European countries. As reported by the Bank for International Settlements (1998), in 1996 pen-
sion fund assets represented only 3 percent of total GDP in Germany and 4 percent in Italy, while 
in the U.S. and the U.K., the shares are 57 percent and 77 percent, respectively (see table 2). 
Götzfried (1999) presents a more detailed analysis of the role of pension funds in major European 
countries. His results are based on a survey conducted by Eurostat in 1997. As might be ex-
pected, the number of independent pension funds is high in those countries that rely heavily on 
funded pension schemes, i.e., the Netherlands and Switzerland (there are no comparable data for 
                                                 
4 The impact of pension reform on financial markets has also been analyzed, with slightly different objectives, by Blommestein 
(2001), Scatigna (2001), and Davis (2002). 
 6
the U.K.). In contrast, the number of independent pension funds in Germany is extremely small. 
At the same time, Germany has the largest number of firm-specific pension plans among those 
European countries covered, but in terms of their investment behavior, these are very different 
from pension funds in the narrow sense of the word. 
There are several reasons for these differences in the economic role of pension funds. 
First, and most importantly, the majority of pension income is provided by the public PAYG pen-
sion system, as has been described in section 3. Thus, few households invest in pension funds in 
the first place. Second, mainly due to tax advantages, individual retirement saving has tradition-
ally been channeled mainly into whole life insurance. Life insurance companies are legally 
barred from investing more than a small part of their portfolios in stocks – up to about 30 percent 
of assets for traditional whole life insurance according to life insurance regulations, but much less 
in practice.5 Third, typical for Germany, less so for France and Italy, assets that are accumulated 
for funded firm pension schemes are often not invested in the capital market, but are set aside as 
capital reserves in firms’ balance sheets, again because of legal and tax reasons. As a result of 
these institutional arrangements, France, Germany, and Italy have few institutional investors and 
stock market capitalization is low by international standards (see table 2 above).  
Given the small role that pensions have historically had in the three large continental 
European countries with dominant PAYG pension systems, we cannot provide empirical evi-
dence based on past experience. Rather, we discuss how pension funds influence corporate gov-
ernance in those countries in which they already play a major role. These countries provide a 
large number of studies which evaluate the effectiveness of pension fund activism. Black (1998) 
surveys the literature on large shareholder and pension fund activism and concludes that pension 
fund interventions are generally ineffective. However, there are also quite a few studies which 
indicate that pension fund activism has beneficial effects and that agency problems are not a ma-
jor concern in practice. For example, Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) study shareholder propos-
als of the largest, most active funds from 1987 through 1993. They conclude that pension funds 
are successful at monitoring and promoting change in target firms, and they do not find evidence 
                                                 
5  In Germany, insurance companies have recently started to offer other life-insurance products which allow heavy investment in 
risky assets such as stocks in recent years, but until now, they claim only a small share of the market.  
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to support that funds have other motivations than value maximization. This result can be inter-
preted as indicating that agency problems might not be a major concern in practice.  
Several empirical studies concentrate on the best-known example of an active pension 
fund, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), the largest public pension 
fund in the U.S. and third largest in the world with total assets over 164 billion US Dollar in 
1999. Over the last decade, CalPERS has been at the forefront of shareholder activism, with an 
explicit goal “to efficiently and effectively manage investments to achieve the highest possible 
return at an acceptable level of risk.” To this end, CalPERS reviews the performance of the U.S. 
companies in its stock portfolio on a regular basis and identifies those that are among the lowest 
long-term relative performers. This review process results in a list of companies that are publicly 
identified as a “CalPERS focus company”. In 1999, this list covered nine companies. Among 
other interventions, CalPERS filed 65 shareholder’s proposals in order to improve firm perform-
ance of its focus companies during the 1987-1998 period. The average annual rate of return was 
13.2% over these ten years.6 Nesbitt (1994) reports weak evidence that CalPERS interventions 
affected stock prices of targeted firms positively. Smith (1996) analyzes 51 firms out of the 78 
targeting events of CalPERS over the 1987-93 period. He finds that shareholder wealth increases 
for firms that adopt or settle, and decreases for firms that resist changes proposed by CalPERS. 
Smith concludes that “shareholder activism is largely successful in changing governance struc-
ture, and, when successful, results in a statistically significant increase in shareholder value” (p. 
251).  
Based on these theoretical and empirical findings about the link between active pension 
funds and firm performance, we expect that an increase in the volume of equity and corporate 
bonds controlled by institutional investors would have noticeable effects on corporate govern-
ance in continental European countries, and thus provide positive effects on aggregate productiv-
ity. We are, however, aware of counterexamples. While we have seen that pension funds have 
helped to improve corporate governance and productivity in many instances, there are also cases 
in which investment funds did not perform so well. A prominent example is the case of the provi-
dent funds in Southeast-Asia which have destroyed wealth, as detailed by Asher (1998). While 
                                                 
6 These figures and statements are taken from CalPERS’ internet site (http://www.calpers-governance.org). This site contains 
detailed information on CalPERS’ investment strategy and its position on corporate governance and shareholder activism. 
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they contributed to economic growth through a massive accumulation of capital, they did not 
increase total factor productivity; see also Kim and Lau (1994) and Young (1994). These two 
faces of the Asian miracle were of dramatic relevance in the recent Asian crisis, and they bear 
several lessons for funded pension systems. In particular, the Asian experience shows the impor-
tance of competition among institutional investors as realized in the Anglo-Saxon countries and, 
to a lesser extent, in the Netherlands and Switzerland. 
As stated in the introduction, this paper is mainly concerned with the large continental 
European countries, notably France, Germany, and Italy, which, as we will argue in the following 
section, will build up significant retirement saving during the next decades, mainly channeled 
through institutional investors. Section 4 will then investigate the potential effects of these capital 
market changes on economic performance. 
3.  Capital market implications of population aging and pension reform 
Population aging puts tremendous pressures on the contribution-based PAYG pension 
systems which dominate retirement income in continental Europe. Prime examples are France, 
Germany, and Italy whose monolithic public pension systems cover almost all workers and pro-
vide most of their retirement incomes.7  While a full transition to pre-funding is both unrealistic 
and undesirable, the scientific debate has converged to a consensus view that a funded compo-
nent needs to be introduced in order to complement the existing PAYG systems; see, among oth-
ers, Miles and Timmermann (1999), Boldrin, Dolado, Jimeno, and Peracchi (1999), Disney 
(2000), Sinn (2000), and Börsch-Supan (2002). Pension reforms that entail a significant extent of 
pre-funding have also become politically more attractive (Boeri, Börsch-Supan, and Tabellini, 
2001, 2002). In fact, Italy has started in the mid 1990s to implement a mixed multi-pillar systems 
for new entrants, Germany has acted later but introduced a much faster transition in 2001 and 
2004, and it appears that France will follow suit, albeit at slow speed. With a larger share of pre-
funded pensions, capital markets and their governance mechanisms will play an increasingly im-
portant role in the future. 
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The main task of this section is to show how large this role will be under realistic assump-
tions, using a multi-country OLG model that allows for quantitative projections of the savings 
generated under population aging and pension reform. This model is an important first step in our 
chain of arguments: it shows the quantitative importance of the shifts in the demand and supply 
of capital that will be induced by population aging and pension reform. The task is difficult be-
cause there are several countervailing forces at work. Population aging changes the balance be-
tween capital and labor. Labor supply is going to be relatively scarce in the aging countries, 
whereas capital is going to be relatively abundant. This will drive up wages relative to the rate of 
return on capital, reducing households’ incentive to save (if the interest elasticity of saving is 
positive). In addition, some fraction of the capital stock may become obsolete due to the shrink-
ing labor force and diminishing returns to scale, making the accumulation of capital even less 
attractive.8   
The picture gets more complicated when three additional aspects are taken into account. 
First, in the shorter term, the behavior of the savings rate is quite different since the strong baby 
boom cohorts reach the most savings-active stage of the life cycle. Second, a domestic view does 
not do justice to the global nature of capital markets. Capital exports from fast-aging countries to 
those countries with a more favorable age structure will reduce the aging-related decline of sav-
ings (Blommestein, 1998; Reisen, 2000).9  Third, pension reform towards a higher degree of pre-
funding will create higher saving rates unless it is fully crowded out by a decline in non-
retirement related savings. 
In order to quantify these countervailing effects, we apply the dynamic simulation model 
developed by Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2004). This model is a multi-country, 85-
generation, endogenous labor supply version of the overlapping generations (OLG) model intro-
duced by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). For our present purposes, this model is well suited be-
cause of three features. First, we use very detailed demographic projections based on United Na-
tions (2002), permitting the study of short- as well as long-term developments. Second, we care-
                                                                                                                                                              
7  For a detailed description of the French pension system see Blanchet (1999), for the German system see Börsch-Supan and 
Schnabel (1999), and for the Italian system see Brugiavini (1999). The Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom are 
notable exceptions from these all-encompassing pay-as-you-go systems. 
8 Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Servén (2000) present empirical evidence for the negative long-run effect of increasing old-age 
dependency ratios on saving. 
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fully model the PAYG pension system enabling us to study the effects of pension reform on the 
aggregate saving rate, including potential crowding out. Third, we model a multi-country setting 
where countries exhibit different aging processes, allowing for endogenous aging-induced capital 
mobility.  
Figures 1 through 3 present the results. We focus on the region defined by the three large 
Continental European countries, France, Germany and Italy. Figure 1 is our baseline projection 
of the effect of population aging on the aggregate household saving rate. This effect depends on 
the international diversification possibilities, represented by three capital mobility scenarios. We 
first model the three large Continental European countries as a single closed economy. We then 
simulate a two-region world consisting of the three countries as one region and the other OECD 
countries as the other region with free capital mobility between the two regions. Third, we show 
a three-region model with the rest of the world as a third region under global free capital mobil-
ity. 
Figures 2 and 3 display the additional effects of a prototypical pension reform. In the 
baseline scenario, the existing PAYG systems in the three countries are maintained at the 2006 
replacement rates. The pension reform scenario is based on a stylized pension reform which in-
duces a substantial extent of pre-funding by freezing the 2006 contribution rates of the PAYG 
pillars. A funded pillar is implicitly introduced by freezing the PAYG contribution rate and re-
ducing PAYG benefits accordingly. This induces the rational life-cycle planning households in 
our OLG model to increase private saving, leading eventually to a mix in which about one third 
of retirement income comes from private saving and two thirds from the PAYG system. 
Figure 1 shows that population aging results in a substantial drop of the aggregate saving 
rates in France, Germany and Italy under the current PAYG system. The aggregate saving rate 
decreases from 2000 until about 2050 across all capital mobility scenarios since the baby boom 
generation decumulates assets. In the existing pension systems scenario, the decrease of the sav-
ings rate caused by population aging – the difference between the value in 2000 and the mini-
mum reached in about 2050 – is roughly 5 percentage points in the three-country closed-
                                                                                                                                                              
9 There is some empirical evidence that the mechanism of age-induced capital flows is already at work (e.g., Higgins, 1998; 
Lührmann, 2003). 
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economy scenario and about 6.5 to 7.5 percentage points if we allow for capital mobility within 
the OECD and the entire world, respectively. 
Figure 2 shows the differential effect of a stylized pension reform that freezes PAYG con-
tribution rates after 2006 and therefore increases the role of private retirement provision. Pro-
jected aggregate saving rates under a fundamental pension reform are substantially higher than 
without pension reform, in particular in the open-economy scenarios (about 2 percentage points). 
Hence, optimal life-cycle behavior generates additional saving under a fundamental pension re-
form, even though some crowding out takes place. Our projections indicate a substitution of 
about one third, leaving two thirds to new saving. 
Finally, figure 3 shows the leverage of newly created retirement saving on the capital 
market. It displays the amounts seen in figure 2 as share of total saving. Even in the closed econ-
omy scenarios, this share reaches 30 percent at the peak of the aging process. More retirement 
saving is generated when international capital markets permit higher returns in those countries 
which age less than France, Germany and Italy. This leads to retirement saving shares in excess 
of 50 percent of total saving around the year 2050, creating a substantial leverage for potential 
productivity effects.10 
Are these projections credible? Their crucial ingredient is the consumption smoothing 
life-cycle saving mechanisms employed in the OLG model. Is this backed by the microeconomet-
ric evidence? Figure 4 shows, by age group, median saving rates in France, Germany, Italy and 
the Netherlands. They are based on a comparable longitudinal framework, represent life-cycle 
saving purged from cohort effects, and employ comparable variable definitions and data sources 
as part of the International Saving Comparisons Project (Börsch-Supan, 2001). The saving pro-
files in France, Germany, and Italy are rather flat and show no dissaving in old age, in contrast to 
the strong hump shape generated by the simple life-cycle saving mechanism. Does this invalidate 
the projections of figures 1 through 3? 
We do not think so. A tempting explanation of the flat life-cycle saving profiles is that the 
high replacement rates of the public pension systems in these countries have made private retire-
                                                 
10 The shares in figure 3 are an underestimate since they do not include those new retirement savings that have crowded out other 
saving (about one third in the closed economy case). 
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ment income largely unnecessary.11  If other saving motives, such as precaution and intergenera-
tional transfers, are more important than retirement saving, age-saving profiles are likely to be 
much flatter than under the textbook life-cycle hypotheses which predicts saving in young and 
dissaving in old age. This explanation is in line with the work by Jappelli and Modigliani (1998) 
who argue that the main mechanism for “retirement saving” in Italy is the PAYG system. While 
we lack the most appropriate counterfactual to substantiate this explanation – French, German, 
and Italian data from times when these countries had no PAYG systems – figure 4 depicts the 
case of the Netherlands which have, as opposed to France, Germany, and Italy, only a small base 
pension provided by their PAYG public pension system. All additional retirement income in the 
Netherlands has to be provided by (mandatory) savings plans, commonly provided through occu-
pational pension plans. Figure 4 shows that the median Dutch household has a much more pro-
nounced hump-shaped life-cycle savings profile than the median French, German, and Italian 
households, and it exhibits dissaving among the elderly as they draw down their mandatory sav-
ing accounts. 
This cross-national microeconomic evidence therefore suggests that the consumption-
smoothing mechanism employed in the OLG model may be a quite appropriate prediction device. 
A pension reform towards a multi-pillar system with a substantial portion of funded retirement 
income will revive the retirement motive for saving in France, Germany, and Italy. In fact, these 
systems will look very similar to the current Dutch system. Hence, it is likely that saving rates 
among the young will increase (to accumulate retirement savings), and saving rates among the 
elderly will decline sharply (because they will dissolve their retirement savings), just as in our 
OLG model. Combining the results of figures 1 and 4 gives us an order of magnitude for those 
effects. The net saving rate of the average German household in mid age would increase by about 
4 percentage points from 11 to 15 percent, while the saving rate would decrease by about 6 per-
centage points from 4 to –2 percent in old age, when retirement accounts are drawn down for 
consumption. Portfolio composition is likely to change under such a shift. The increase in saving 
by the middle-aged predicted above amounts to between 15 and 18 percent of those households’ 
portfolios, quite close to the actual shares currently observed in the United Kingdom, the U.S., 
                                                 
11  See Boeri, Börsch-Supan and Tabellini (2001) for a comparison of replacement rates. 
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the Netherlands and Switzerland. These additional retirement savings are the basis for the poten-
tial productivity effects to which we now turn. 
4. Institutional investors and firm performance in Germany and the UK 
Ultimately, higher productivity must be generated at the firm level. In this section, we 
therefore investigate the impact of the various mechanisms discussed in the previous section – in 
particular, the role of institutional investors as growing players on the capital markets – on firm-
level productivity growth using newly assembled firm-level data in Germany and the UK. The 
core idea of this section is to parametrize total factor productivity by the key factors that were 
identified in section 2 as main channels through which capital markets affect productivity, nota-
bly variables which describe financial market conditions and the stringency of corporate govern-
ance, plus possibly confounding factors.  
The analysis in this section is driven by three working hypotheses: 
• Hypothesis 1: Tight owner control increases productivity growth. 
• Hypothesis 2: Tight creditor control increases productivity growth. 
• Hypothesis 3: Monitoring by traditional financial institutions (such as banks and insurance 
companies) and non-financial firms should be more important for Germany, whereas moni-
toring by advanced financial institutions (such as mutual funds and pension funds) should be 
more important for the UK. Their impact on productivity growth might differ. 
The first hypothesis follows Shleifer and Vishny (1986) who argue that a large share 
block provides the owner with an incentive to collect information and to monitor management. A 
large blockholder also has enough voting power to put pressure on management. In contrast, in 
firms with a dispersed shareholder structure free-riding behavior should make monitoring too 
costly (Grossman and Hart, 1980). Hence, we expect closer monitoring for firms under control of 
a strong owner, and that this is reflected in higher productivity growth.  
The second hypothesis recognizes that also creditors and bondholders may perform a dis-
ciplinary function. Jensen (1986) argues that debt financing reduces free cash flow and therefore 
has a disciplinary effect on management. Management can use high leverage to signal credibly 
that they maximize profits. We expect that any disciplinary impact that creditors have on man-
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agement should be the greatest when a large fraction of debt is bank debt. Likewise, pressure 
from bondholders should be the greatest when a large fraction of current earnings must be used to 
pay interest on debt obligations, i.e., when interest coverage is low. 
The corporate governance systems of Germany and the UK feature some fundamental dif-
ferences. Germany is often described as having a bank-based governance system because Ger-
man banks possess a variety of control rights through direct share ownership, voting power based 
on proxy votes, long-term lending relationships to borrowers, and supervisory board membership 
(Edwards and Fischer, 1994). In contrast, the UK is often described as having a market-based 
governance system because capital markets are deep, institutional ownership of stock is high 
(e.g., through mutual funds and pension funds), and takeovers occur regularly. The third hy-
pothesis states that these differences in the institutional setting and the capital market environ-
ment support particular governance mechanisms in Germany (such as monitoring by banks and 
insurance companies) and others in the UK (such as monitoring by mutual and pension funds). 
Theoretical arguments support the notion that the quality of monitoring depends on the type of 
shareholder. Hence, we investigate Germany and the UK separately and employ country-specific 
measures for ownership and capital structure. 
In addition, the impact of ownership and capital structure may depend on the environment 
a firm is operating in. More specifically, we expect that shareholders and creditors/bondholder 
increase governance action when a firm runs into financial difficulties. The reason is that poor 
financial performance may serve as a signal of poor management quality. Similarly, intense prod-
uct market competition may strengthen corporate governance action by shareholders and credi-
tors/bondholders when managers’ performance becomes clearly observable.12 To capture these 
potential effects, a set of control variables needs to be included in our empirical analysis. 
4.1 The model 
Starting point of our analysis is a conventional production function which relates output 
to capital, labor and total factor productivity (TFP): 
                                                 
12  In turn, intense competition may also make corporate governance action less necessary when competition alone is sufficient 
to assure good management. 
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  (1) 
where yit denotes output, kit capital, lit labor and ait TFP of firm i in year t, all expressed in logs. 
Time effects µt filter out aggregate productivity shocks. Heterogeneity and state dependence are 
captured by the fixed firm effect αi and by lagged output yit-1, weighted by λ, respectively. We 
eliminate the fixed firm effects by taking first differences of equation (1) and parametrize produc-
tivity growth with our variables of core interest: 
  (2) 
4.2 The data 
We use firm-level data from Germany and the UK. For Germany, the sample covers the 
years 1986-1996 and contains data from 1074 firms (6476 firm years). These firms are large cor-
porations which are listed or not listed on a German stock exchange. The sample covers ap-
proximately 63% of all large public corporations (Aktiengesellschaft) and is therefore 
representative for this type of firm.13 Coverage of private corporations (GmbH) is much thinner 
and concentrates on larger firms. Most firms belong to the manufacturing sector (841 firms), a 
smaller number to the construction industry (57 firms) and wholesale and retail trade (176 firms). 
Balance sheet data are taken from Hoppenstedt’s Bilanzdatenbank, which is commercially 
available. Information on ownership structure is collected from various editions of Hypobank‘s 
Aktienführer as well as Hoppenstedt’s Konzernstrukturdatenbank. A detailed description of these 
data sources can be found in Köke (2002a). 
For the UK, our sample covers the years 1992-1999 and contains data from 502 firms, all 
of which are listed on the London Stock Exchange. The sample consists of more than one third of 
all non-financial listed firms and captures over 85% of market capitalization. The largest number 
of firms belongs to the manufacturing sector (314 firms), a smaller number to the construction 
industry (35 firms), and wholesale and retail trade (153 firms). Balance sheet data are taken from 
                                                 
13 The sample excludes all firms from the financial services industries as well as firms that operate in industries still heavily 
regulated during the period of observation (e.g., media, telecommunication, and transport). 
ittiititKitLitit aklyy εµαλβλβλλ +++−+−+−+= − )1()1()1(1
itititit IABLESCONTROLVARTUCTUREOWNERSHIPSSTRUCTURECAPITALa ⋅+⋅+⋅=∆ 321 βββ
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Thomson Financial Datastream, which is commercially available. Information on ownership 
structure is collected from Worldscope Disclosure archives. To make the distinction between the 
more than 5000 insider and outsider individual shareholders, we consulted the London Stock 
Exchange Monitor and the “Who’s Who” guides. To identify institutional shareholders, we con-
sulted Datastream, Institutional Investors Annual Guides and the world wide web. 
To measure corporate governance, we use data on ownership structure and capital struc-
ture. The main variable to measure ownership is an indicator whether a firm is under control of a 
large blockholder or not (CONTROL). For the UK, this variable indicates the presence of a share-
holder who owns at least 10% of all outstanding shares. This definition takes into account that 
ownership in the UK is relatively dispersed and a block of 10% already represents a large block. 
For Germany, ownership concentration is much higher than in the UK, and German corporations 
are often owned through pyramid structures and cross-shareholdings (Becht and Röell, 1999). 
These two characteristics imply that concentration measured at the direct level of ownership can 
be misleading for German firms (Becht and Böhmer, 2003; Köke, 2002b). Therefore, for Ger-
many CONTROL indicates whether a firm is under control of awell-defined ultimate owner 
(rather than under dispersed ownership or held by two or more blocks of about equal size). The 
concept of ultimate ownership, described in detail by Köke (2002b), allows for complex control 
structures and high ownership concentration. Applying these measures to our sample, see table 4, 
we find that 89.6% of German firms have an ultimately controlling shareholder, and 83.0% of 
UK firms have a shareholder who owns at least 10% of all outstanding shares. 
We also identify the type of the controlling shareholder for each firm (TYPE). In our sam-
ple, the largest fraction of German firms is ultimately owned by a non-financial firm (41.4%) or a 
private owner (35.6%), see table 4. Only 5.4% of sample firms are ultimately owned by a bank, 
and 2.3% are controlled by other financial institutions. For the UK, the distribution of sharehold-
ers is strikingly different. The largest fraction of firms is controlled by a financial firm (45.3%). 
Among these, mutual and pension funds are the dominant category (39.2%). The position of pri-
vate owners (29.4%) is comparable to Germany. 
Regarding capital structure, we use different measures for Germany and the UK. For Ger-
many, our preferred measure is the ratio of bank debt to total debt (BANK). We expect this meas-
ure to be a good proxy for the power of banks in bank-based Germany. For the UK, the role of 
banks is not as prominent as in Germany. In the market-based UK system, all types of bondhold-
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ers may play a governance role. Therefore, our preferred measure is the borrowing ratio 
(BORROW), which is measured as interest payments over earnings before interest, taxes, and 
depreciation. In the present sample, the ratio of bank debt to total debt amounts to 26.1% on av-
erage for Germany. For the UK, we find an average borrowing ratio of 15.1% (see table 4). 
To measure the intensity of product market competition, we determine firm’s rents from 
production (RENT) which can be interpreted as an ex post measure of market power. It serves as 
an inverse measure of competition. The motivation for using this measure is that firms operating 
in less competitive markets should be able to sell their products well above marginal cost, and 
therefore earn higher rents after covering their expenses (on capital, labor, and materials); see 
Nickell, Nicolitsas, and Dryden (1997) and Januszewski, Köke, and Winter (2002) for earlier 
empirical implementations of these competition measures.  
4.3 Estimation results and interpretation 
Our empirical model of productivity growth is given by equations (1) and (2). The struc-
ture of this model corresponds to the differenced panel model with lagged endogenous variables 
considered by Arellano and Bond (1991). We employ their generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimator that allows to exploit lags of the lagged dependent variable as well as lags of 
the explanatory variables as instruments. Using this approach addresses the potential endogeneity 
problems with respect to the corporate governance and competition variables.14 
In a first step, we relate debtholder influence (measured as BANK for Germany and 
BORROW for the UK) and shareholder influence (measured as CONTROL) to productivity 
growth; see model 1 in table 5. For Germany, we find that a higher fraction of bank debt to total 
debt is associated with higher productivity growth. Interpreting bank debt as a measure of credi-
tor influence, these findings suggest that firms experience higher productivity growth when being 
under tight creditor control. Note that only about one quarter of German firms are under such 
                                                 
14 Arellano and Bond (1991) show that endogenous variables lagged two or more periods are valid instruments, provided there is 
no serial correlation in the time-varying component of the error terms in equation (2); we test this condition for all specifications. 
The instruments we use are yit-j for j ≥ 2, and second lags of RENT and ASSET. We test for instrument validity using a Sargan test 
of over-identifying restrictions. We report those tests together with the estimation results and standard errors that are robust with 
respect to general heteroskedasticity in the next section. Following Arellano and Bond (1991), we use the two-step version of the 
GMM estimator for obtaining the Sargan test statistic, while coefficient estimates are based on the one-step version. Arellano and 
Bond report that the one-step Sargan test is sensitive to heteroskedasticity, tending to over-reject the null. 
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tight control (see table 4). For the UK, none of these measures has an impact on productivity 
growth. 
In a second step, we investigate the interaction between competition (measured as RENT), 
poor performance (measured as LOSS) and corporate governance; see model 2 in table 5. For 
Germany, we find evidence that the disciplinary impact of high bank debt on productivity growth 
is strenghtened by poor financial performance. This suggests that creditors improve corporate 
governance particularly when firms are in financial difficulties, i.e., when they are dependent on 
bank credit. The interaction of rent and bank debt is weakly significant and positive, indicating 
that intense competition and creditor influence are substitutes. Regarding shareholder influence, 
the presence of a strong owner has a beneficial impact on productivity growth. The interaction of 
rents and shareholder influence is significantly negative, indicating that intense competition and 
shareholder influence are complements. For the UK, we find a negative coefficient of 
CONTROL, our indicator variable for tight owner control, and positive interaction terms with 
RENT and LOSS. These results suggest that the presence of a large shareholder has a negative 
impact on productivity growth, and intense competition in product markets cannot compensate 
for this effect. Only when financial performance is poor, i.e., when the respective firm makes 
earnings losses, tight owner control has a beneficial impact on productivity growth and may over-
compensate for the negative impact of shareholder control. Competition by itself has a weakly 
beneficial impact on productivity growth. 
In a third step, we make use of detailed information regarding the type of shareholders. 
More specifically, we identify the type of the ultimate owner (for Germany) and the type of the 
largest shareholder that owns more than 10% of outstanding shares (for the UK). These types of 
owners, detailed in table 4, enter the regression model instead of CONTROL and are interacted 
with RENT and LOSS, see model 3 in table 6.15  For Germany, bank debt keeps its beneficial im-
pact on productivity growth for firms in financial difficulties. Likewise, firms under tight owner 
control show significantly higher productivity growth, but only when the ultimate owner is a 
bank or an insurance company. This is an important result: Companies under the control of insti-
tutional investors have higher productivity – but less than 8% of German firms are under such 
control (5.4% are ultimately owned by banks, 2.3% by insurance companies, see table 4). 
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This beneficial impact of shareholder control is reinforced by intense product market 
competition, as the negative coefficient of the interaction between TYPE and RENT indicates. 
There is also weak evidence that firms under government control show higher productivity 
growth; again this effect becomes stronger when at the same time competition is intense. For the 
UK, the intensity of competition keeps its positive impact on productivity growth. The analysis 
of different types of shareholders reveals where the negative impact of a strong owner comes 
from: it is mainly the influence of insiders, i.e., executive and non-executive directors, that re-
duces productivity growth. This negative impact is not compensated by intense competition in 
the product markets. Taking the sum of the coefficients for RENT, TYPEj, and the interaction of 
both variables gives the impact of RENT for firms under control of shareholder category j. A 
Wald test shows that this impact is positive for private insider and zero for banks. For all other 
types of shareholders, this joint impact of RENT and TYPE is zero. Generally, intense competi-
tion does not appear to have a beneficial impact on productivity growth for firms under strong 
ownership. Vice versa, these findings imply that competition plays a disciplinary role for firms 
under dispersed ownership. Finally, the interaction of TYPE with the indicator for earnings losses 
(LOSS) shows that private shareholders, banks, and funds have a beneficial impact on productiv-
ity growth for firms in financial difficulties. All versions of our GMM model are supported by 
the standard battery of specification tests. In particular, the Sargan tests do not reject the hy-
pothesis of instrument validity. We also test the sensitivity of our results with respect to alterna-
tive definitions of key explanatory variables and find that none of our key results is sensitive to 
these sensitivity checks. 
In summary, therefore, our findings suggest that financial institutions do indeed fulfill a 
monitoring function. In Germany, institutional investors – banks and insurance companies – have 
a beneficial impact on productivity growth. German banks also play a disciplinary role as credi-
tors because they enhance productivity growth of poorly performing borrowers. These results 
stand at odds with a skeptical view on the German model of corporate governance. It is often 
argued that corporate governance in Germany is too bank-oriented and therefore too inflexible 
compared with the Anglo-Saxon market-oriented system. While we do not explicitly test for the 
impact of ‘housebank‘ relations, our results suggest that lending relationships and institutional 
                                                                                                                                                              
15 The owner category ‘dispersed‘ acts as the reference category. 
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ownership in Germany cannot simply be dismissed as too inflexible and outdated, as often ar-
gued. Our results are therefore consistent with Cable (1985), who documents a disciplinary role 
of German banks for the 1970’s, and with Elsas and Krahnen (1998), who confirm (based on 
credit-file data) that German housebanks provide liquidity insurance in times of financial diffi-
culties.16  Renneboog (2000) provides a similarly positive assessment of Belgian banks. The im-
portant point here, however, is that this beneficial impact on tight control through institutional 
investors is rarely realized because most firms are under less tight control. Only 7.7% of German 
firms are ultimately owned by institutional investors. 
For the UK, we do not find evidence that creditors or bondholders have a beneficial im-
pact on productivity growth. Whereas past research on the monitoring ability of institutions 
(Franks, Mayer, and Renneboog, 2001) and on the role of occupational pension funds (Faccio 
and Lasfer, 2000) doubts that institutions contribute to good corporate governance, we find that 
the presence of financial institutions as shareholders (in particular, mutual and pension funds) 
stimulates productivity. Especially when firms are in financial difficulties and funds own a large 
fraction of outstanding shares, total factor productivity grows faster than in other firms. The 
beneficial impact on firm performance of these sophisticated institutional investors is consistent 
with evidence from the US (Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach, 1998; del Guercio and Hawkins, 
1999), although the absence of a beneficial impact of other types of large shareholders as well as 
creditors also stands in contrast with Nickell, Nicolitsas, and Dryden (1997) and Nickell and 
Nicolitsas (1999), who report that creditors and non-financial companies as shareholders tend to 
influence productivity growth positively. 
5. Summary and policy conclusions 
We have shown that population aging will change saving behavior, and that pension re-
form – an ongoing process in the core European countries – will amplify these changes. Popula-
                                                 
16 Our results are also consistent with Gorton and Schmid (2000) and Lehmann and Weigand (2000) who find a positive impact 
of bank ownership on earnings-based performance measures. However, they are inconsistent with Edwards and Nibler (2000), 
who do not find evidence that German banks are different from other large corporate shareholders, and Januszewski et al. (2002), 
who report a negative impact of financial institutions on productivity growth. While similar in methodology, the latter study had 
to neglect the role of capital structure, its interaction with competition, and the impact of poor financial performance, because 
appropriate data were not yet available. 
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tion aging will induce an increase in savings between 2015 and 2025. Saving rates will decline 
thereafter. Pension reform adds to the increase and dampens the decrease even though about one 
third of saving for retirement will displace other saving. A higher than current share of saving 
will then flow through stock and bond markets, thereby changing the nature of the capital mar-
kets in those countries in which stock market capitalization is low and industrial bonds are rare – 
notably in the three large Continental European countries France, Germany, and Italy. Moreover, 
this paper has assembled evidence that the size of capital markets and productivity growth are 
related, and that larger capital markets and actively managed investment and pension funds en-
hance corporate governance. Hence, there are beneficial side effects through capital markets 
which will dampen the negative effects of population aging. 
Our argument also adds a new and important dimension to the continuing debate of ad-
vantages and disadvantages of PAYG and fully funded pension systems. While we know that in 
steady state, funded pension systems are advantageous relative to PAYG pension systems when-
ever the interest rate exceeds the growth rate of the wage bill, we also know that this is of little 
help in the case of an economy which already has a PAYG pension system, as stressed by Sinn 
(2000).  Such an economy has to pay back its implicit debt which had financed pension payments 
to the first generation of beneficiaries, before being able to enjoy the advantages of a funded sys-
tem.  Paying back this implicit debt implies a consumption loss – the so-called transition burden.  
In a simple Solow economy with a fixed technology, the consumption loss due to the transition 
burden is exactly equal to the consumption gain that will be achieved through the higher capital 
stock in a funded pension system (Aaron, 1966).  The result also holds under more general condi-
tions, e.g., when pension benefits must be financed by distorting payroll taxes that are in propor-
tion to pension benefits (Brunner, 1996; Fenge, 1997). 
This equivalence result, however, rests on a crucial condition, namely fixed household 
behavior (i.e., saving rates and portfolio choice) and a fixed technology (i.e., factor productiv-
ities). We have argued in this paper that these assumptions are counterfactual. Rather, we are 
likely to experience changing saving rates and portfolio choices, and we will see major shifts in 
the allocation of capital, inducing changes in efficiency in those countries that have thin capital 
markets, such as France, Germany, and Italy. This opens the possibility for efficiency and welfare 
gains of a partial transition from a PAYG to a funded pension system, which reduce and even 
might outweigh the transition burden. 
 22
Is this possibility a real one? Aren’t these capital market effects quantitatively irrelevant 
second order effects? We believe not. In order to assess the magnitude of the potential feedback 
effects that must be induced by improvements in capital allocation in order to compensate for the 
transition burden, consider again our example of a fundamental pension reform in Continental 
Europe that would imply a partial transition towards a one-third funded pension system. We 
again use the macroeconomic simulation model developed by Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Win-
ter (2004) to quantify these effects. Figure 5 shows the utility loss implied by the transition bur-
den of the pension reform. Without positive efficiency effects, some generations would be net 
losers. Figure 5 also shows the utility gains and losses for various increases in total factor pro-
ductivity. Already a relatively small transient productivity effect of just 0.2 percentage points per 
year makes all generations better off. 
This is an important result. It must be appreciated together with the political economy ar-
guments made by Boeri, Boersch-Supan, and Tabellini (2001, 2002). They found that people in 
France, Germany, and Italy are well aware that population aging will put their pension systems 
into crisis. A majority also agrees to a fundamental pension reform in wishing to opt out of the 
PAYG systems in favor of a mandatory partially funded system. Not too surprisingly, however, 
the people did not like the idea of bearing a transition burden. This is where this paper fills in: 
Even small gains in the efficiency of capital allocation in the wake of population aging and pen-
sion reform suffice to compensate for this transition burden, thereby fundamentally changing the 
political economy of pension reform. 
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Table 1: The future of pay-as-you-go pension systems 
 1995 2010 2030 
France    
   Pension expenditures  (%GDP) 12.5 12.6 19.4 
   Equilibrium contribution rate   (%wage bill) 24.3 24.4 37.7 
   Fiscal deficit   (%wage bill) 0.5 0.6 100.5 
Germany    
   Pension expenditures  (%GDP) 10.0 11.0 18.4 
   Equilibrium contribution rate   (%wage bill) 22.6 24.7 41.1 
   Fiscal deficit   (%wage bill) (1.1)a 8.8 115.6 
Italy    
   Pension expenditures  (%GDP) 16.0 15.2 23.3 
   Equilibrium contribution rate   (%wage bill) 42.6 40.4 61.9 
   Fiscal deficit   (%wage bill) 0 29.9 186.8 
Notes: The equilibrium contribution rate is the percent of the wage bill required if the increase in pension expendi-
tures is financed by contributions only. The fiscal deficit is the percent of the wage bill arising if the increase in 
pension expenditures is financed by debt only. a) Surplus.  
Source: Chand and Jaeger (1996). 
Table 2: Capital markets in countries with pay-as-you-go and funded pensions systems 
 Pay-as-you-go systems Partially funded systems 
 Year France Germany Italy Netherlands UK US 
1995 32.6 23.9 19.3 72.1 121.6 95.2 
1998 68.1 50.9 47.5 153.5 168.2 144.9 
Stock market capitalization   
(% of GDP) a 
2000 111.8 67.6 72.3 174.3 183.8 153.3 
1995  77.7 45.3 32.0 154.5 164.0 151.9 Assets held by institutional 
investors (% of GDP) b 
1998 107.3 66.1 79.6 193.2 203.6 192 
Assets held by pension funds  
(% of total assets of institutional 
investors) c 
1998 . 5 5 58 38 37 
1995 . 65.3 39.0 352.1 759.7 4,259.5 Assets held by pension funds 
(billion USD) a 
1998 . 69.5 37.4 323.0 1,136.5 7,161.6 
1995 1.8 5.6 0.8 35.5 22.3 23.4 Pension fund investment  
(% of household wealth) d 2000 1.5 5.2 1.2 37.7 22.1 23.8 
Sources: a) Deutsches Aktieninstitut (2002); b) OECD (2001); c) OECD (2000); d) Babeau and Sbano (2003). 
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Table 3: Capital performance relative to the United States 
 France Germany Italy 
Aggregate return on investment a 77 61 50 
Mean return on investment (firm sample) b 73 72 57 
Market sector capital productivity c 72 67 . 
Total factor productivity d 82 81 84 
Note: All figures are expressed as a percentage of the corresponding U.S. value. 
Sources: a) Mueller and Yurtoglu (2000), Table 2.  b) ditto, Table 4.  c) Börsch-Supan (1998), Table 3.  
d) Hall and Jones (1996), Table 9. 
Table 4: Corporate governance variables 
 Germany UK 
 Mean ownership concentration (median in parentheses) 
Strong owner (CONTROL) 89.6% (100%) 83.0% (100.0%) 
Ownership concentration (BLOCK) 75.6% (90.0%) 20.8% (15.6%) 
Ownership concentration (HERF) 66.9% (81.0%) 8.3% (4.6%) 
 Type of ultimate owner Type of largest shareholder 
Individuals 35.6% 29.4% 
   thereof: Insider 25.0% 26.9% 
Financial firm   7.8% 45.3% 
   thereof: Bank   5.4% 3.7% 
                Insurance company   2.3%   2.0% 
                Mutual fund   0.0% 39.2% 
Non-financial firm 41.4%   8.3% 
Government   4.8%   0.0% 
Dispersed 10.4% 17.0% 
 Measure of capital structure 
Bank debt ratio (BANK) 26.1%  
Borrowing ratio (BORROW)  15.1% 
Number of observations 6476 2280 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on German and UK firm panel. 
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Table 5: Effects of corporate governance and product market competition on productivity growth 
 Dependent variable: output growth (∆ yit) 
Independent variables Model 
(1GERMANY) 
Model 
(2GERMANY) 
  Model (1UK) Model (2UK)   
   Interaction 
with 
RENTt-1 
Interac-
tion with 
LOSSt-1 
  Interac-
tion with 
RENTt-1 
Interac-
tion with 
LOSSt-1 
Lagged output growth (∆yt-1) -0.116 (0.345) -0.144 (0.200)   0.317** (0.050) 0.286* (0.055)   
Capital growth (∆kt-1) 0.297 (0.271) 0.247 (0.330)   0.145 (0.122) 0.112 (0.181)   
Labor growth (∆lt-1) 0.778*** (0.000) 0.788*** (0.000)   0.662*** 
(0.000) 
0.741*** 
(0.000) 
  
Rent (RENTt-1) -0.638** (0.031) -0.232 (0.510)   -0.039 (0.593) -0.252* (0.091)   
Bank debt (BANKt-1) 0.238** (0.012) -0.415 (0.131) 1.563* 
(0.052) 
5.221** 
(0.030) 
    
Borrowing ratio (BORROWt-1)     -0.043 (0.239) 0.011 (0.837) 0.060 
(0.831) 
0.031 
(0.710) 
Strong owner (CONTROLt-1) 0.002 (0.928) 0.171* (0.084) -0.471* 
(0.083) 
-0.193 
(0.720) 
-0.003 (0.900) -0.079** 
(0.039) 
0.369** 
(0.030) 
0.198*** 
(0.006) 
Business cycle (CYCLEt) 0.010 (0.598) 0.011(0.562)   -0.005 (0.134) -0.006 (0.104)   
Ln (total assets) (ASSETt-1) 0.010 (0.485) 0.006 (0.696)   -0.005 (0.222) -0.002 (0.510)   
Number of observations 3853 3853   832 832   
Instrument validity (Sargan test) p=0.4171 p=0.2629   p=0.3868 p=0.5779   
Second-order corr. of resid. p=0.6753 p=0.7173   p=0.1160 p=0.1094   
Const. returns to scale p=0.5651 p=0.5917   p=0.1086 p=0.1118   
Notes: GMM regression results relating corporate governance and product market competition to productivity growth. The sample includes only manufacturing and 
construction firms. Estimates are obtained using the Arellano and Bond (1991) method. All regressions include time and two-digit industry dummies. Instruments are 
yit-j and the second lags of ASSET and RENT.  The p-values (reported in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors, which are calculated using the  
White/Huber sandwich estimator for the variance-covariance matrix. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  Source: Au-
thors’ calculation. 
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Table 6: Effects of corporate governance and product market competition on productivity growth, ownership categories 
 Dependent variable: output growth (∆ yit) 
Independent variables Model (3GERMANY) Model (3UK) 
  Interaction with 
RENTt-1 
Interaction with 
LOSSt-1 
 Interaction with 
RENTt-1 
Interaction with 
LOSSt-1 
Lagged output growth (∆yt-1) -0.160 (0.136)   0.300** (0.042)   
Capital growth (∆kt-1) 0.273 (0.264)   0.087 (0.262)   
Labor growth (∆lt-1) 0.768*** (0.000)   0.745*** (0.000)   
Rent (RENTt-1) 0.194 (0.505)   -0.262* (0.085)   
Bank debt (BANKt-1) -0.129 (0.703) 0.569 (0.582) 4.443** (0.039)    
Borrowing ratio (BORROWt-1)    0.038 (0.486) -0.170 (0.577) 0.055 (0.554) 
Owner (TYPEt-1 = private) 0.040 (0.693) -0.121 (0.666) 0.598 (0.479)    
Owner (TYPEt-1 = private, insider)    -0.158*** (0.004) 0.686*** (0.005) 0.259** (0.017) 
Owner (TYPEt-1 = private, outsider)    -0.040 (0.291) 0.258 (0.134) 0.319** (0.011) 
Owner (TYPEt-1 = bank) 0.607*** (0.004) -2.388*** (0.006) -1.214 (0.313) -0.063* (0.079) 0.400** (0.023) 0.402** (0.042) 
Owner (TYPEt-1 = insurer) 0.373*** (0.008) -1.089** (0.022) 0.220 (0.369) -0.143 (0.174) 0.442 (0.285) 0.172 (0.137) 
Owner (TYPEt-1 = fund) 2.019 (0.354) -5.391 (0.455) n.a. -0.041 (0.308) 0.232 (0.191) 0.151** (0.044) 
Owner (TYPEt-1 = non-fin. firm) 0.159 (0.155) -0.380 (0.234) -0.119 (0.870) -0.042 (0.435) 0.136 (0.579) 0.175 (0.116) 
Owner (TYPEt-1 = government) 0.440* (0.066) -1.621** (0.017) 0.193 (0.911)    
Business cycle (CYCLEt) 0.011 (0.534)   -0.006 (0.107)   
Ln (total assets) (ASSETt-1) 0.001 (0.918)   -0.004 (0.249)   
Number of observations 3853   832   
Instrument validity (Sargan test) p=0.2707   p=0.6778   
Second-order corr. of resid. p=0.8434   p=0.2273   
Const. returns to scale p=0.5354   p=0.1046   
Notes and source: See Table 5.  
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Figure 1: Saving rates in France, Germany and Italy under alternative capital mobility scenarios 
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Notes: These figures show the projected aggregate saving rate of households living in France, Germany and Italy 
under the current pension scenario. The capital mobility scenarios are as follows. Scenario FraGerIta: perfect capital 
mobility only within the three countries. Scenario OECD: perfect capital mobility with the OECD. Scenario 
WORLD: perfect capital mobility across all world regions. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2004). 
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Figure 2: Reform-induced savings in France, Germany and Italy under alternative capital mobil-
ity scenarios 
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Notes: These figures show the increase of the aggregate saving rate of households living in France, Germany and 
Italy when a fundamental pension reform is implemented in these three countries. The capital mobility scenarios are 
as follows. Scenario FraGerIta: perfect capital mobility only within the three countries. Scenario OECD: perfect 
capital mobility with the OECD. Scenario WORLD: perfect capital mobility across all world regions. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2004). 
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Figure 3: Share of retirement saving in France, Germany and Italy under alternative capital mo-
bility scenarios 
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Notes: These figures show the share of retirement saving in total saving in France, Germany and Italy when a fun-
damental pension reform is implemented in these three countries. The capital mobility scenarios are as follows. Sce-
nario FraGerIta: perfect capital mobility only within the three countries. Scenario OECD: perfect capital mobility 
with the OECD. Scenario WORLD: perfect capital mobility across all world regions. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2004). 
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Figure 4: Cohort-corrected savings rates by age, Germany 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on the International Savings Comparisons Project. France: Fall, Loisy, and 
Talon (2001); Germany: Börsch-Supan, Reil-Held, Rodepeter, Schnabel, and Winter (2001); Italy: Brugiavini and 
Padula (2001); Netherlands: Alessie and Kapteyn (2001). 
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Figure 5: Projected welfare effects of improved productivity growth rates in Germany 
 
Notes: This figure shows, by birth cohort, the change in total discounted life-time utility induced by a fundamental 
pension reform. The for lines correspond to hypothetical transient improvements in the growth rate of total factor 
productivity. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2004). 
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